Non-Profit Marketing Final Exam Case Study Response Paper

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For the final essay writing assignment (worth 100 points), you are going to use one of the 4 case studies at the very end of your textbook in the appendix. Starting on Page 472, there are a series of case studies with questions that follow each one which incorporate many concepts you have learned over the course of this semester. For your final exam, please pick ONE of those, read it carefully, and then take the time to do a little of your own research on the nonprofit in the question. After you have a good comfort level with the nonprofit and the issues presented in the case study, write a 2,000 – 2,500 word essay answering the questions presented at the end of the case study you chose. I am not looking for a question and answer format paper, but rather using the questions at the end of the study to present your findings in an essay format. You may use your textbook as a source obviously. I am looking for well thought out answers that go deeper than the “obvious” answer (i.e., college level critical thinking) so using outside sources will help.

The essay assignment is due 12/11/2020 by 11:59 p.m. Essays should be double spaced with 1″ margins in Times New Roman, 12 point font. You must include a source cited page (I don’t care what format you use).

Appendix Case 2: Share Our Strength/ No Kid Hungry
Relevant Chapters
Chapter 7 (Developing Strategy, Building Capacity, and Managing Risk); Chapter 8 (Collaborations, Partnerships, and Mergers); Chapter 9 (Managing Staff and Service Volunteers); Chapter 10 (Marketing and Communications); Chapter 11 (Advocacy and Lobbying); Chapter 12 (Financial Management); Chapter 13 (Philanthropic Fundraising); Chapter 14 (Social Enterprise and Earned Income); Chapter 15 (Government Grants and Contracts); Chapter 16 (Social Entrepreneurship and Innovation)
Bill Shore grew up in a working-class neighborhood of Pittsburgh, where his father instilled in him a concern for the plight of people who were facing challenges in their lives. Motivated by those values and by the social activism of the 1960s, he had gravitated toward politics and by 1984 held a staff position in the first presidential campaign of Senator Gary Hart. Following the senator’s withdrawal from the race and a brief vacation, Shore was on his way back to work in the senator’s office when he saw a headline in the Washington Post: “200,000 to Die this Summer in Ethiopia.” The threat of imminent famine that would claim so many lives caused Shore to reflect on his own life’s work. As Shore recalls, I sat thinking about what the famine meant, what it would be like for the ravaged families who lived there. For the first time since my involvement in the presidential campaign, I really felt something about world events; I made an emotional connection to something beyond the usual calculations of how they could be turned to political advantage. It just seemed that since I felt so strongly about it, I ought to pay attention to that impulse. (“More Than Food,” 1998) Later that year, working in the basement of a row house in Washington’s Georgetown neighborhood, Shore and his sister Debbie acted on the impulse by founding a new nonprofit organization, using a $2,000 cash advance on a credit card (“Q&A,” 2015). Believing that “everyone has a strength to share in the global fight against hunger and poverty,” they named the new organization Share Our Strength (Share Our Strength, 2
Creating Community Wealth By 1986, the Shores were again working for Senator Hart while running Share Our Strength (SOS) on the side. Their fundraising for SOS consisted primarily of mailings to chefs and restaurant owners, whom they thought might have a particular interest in food. The results from this traditional method were modest. Then, while working for Hart in Denver, the Shores persuaded local chefs to participate in a special event to benefit their young organization. The chefs would offer a sampling of gourmet dishes to guests, with the ticket fees going to benefit SOS. The event raised $10,000, and the Shores calculated that the chefs had given far more in the form of gifts-in-kind and their own time and effort than they ever would have given in cash in response to direct-mail solicitations. This success provided an important insight: “[N] onprofits needed to move away from seeking charitable contributions and toward building strategic partnerships with companies” (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012, p. 91). Despite numerous historical antecedents, the term “social enterprise” was not as widely used in 1984 as it is today, but Shore became convinced that organizations working for social change needed to pursue a new model. He argued that too many nonprofits were dependent on traditional sources of revenue, primarily philanthropy, and were struggling to achieve impact. Too many nonprofit CEOs were distracted from building programs by the constant need to engage in fundraising. Traditional revenue sources were insufficient to bring successful programs to a scale that they could achieve lasting change or assure the sustainability of even successful organizations. Wealth was being created at a historic rate in the business sector, but “nonprofit organizations [had] been left behind” (Shore, 1999, p. 212). Most were “wed to practices that rely on redistributing wealth, rather than committed to the entrepreneurial activities that create wealth” (p. 212). SOS would join other pioneering nonprofits taking a different approach: “creating community wealth through business enterprise, cause-related marketing partnerships, and licensing—directing profits back into the community [italics added]” (p. 143
Partnering With Business For its first 20 years, Share Our Strength operated primarily as a funding intermediary that raised funds and made grants to other nonprofits providing direct services, including food banks and other emergency food assistance programs (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012). The funds were raised by mobilizing the food and restaurant industry through sponsored events. Based on the Shores’ experience in Denver, Taste of the Nation was launched in 1988. The event brought together dozens of chefs and charged diners an entry fee to sample the fare of participating restaurants. The first event, held simultaneously in several cities, raised nearly $250,000 in one day. Over just the next two years, Taste of the Nation expanded to 18 American cities (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012). The events were mutually beneficial to all participants, providing funds for SOS; helping chefs and restaurateurs to get publicity and to visibly associate with SOS’s cause; and providing corporate sponsors, such as Anheuser-Busch, opportunities to develop relationships with participating chefs and restaurants. In 1993, a partnership between Share Our Strength and American Express achieved breakthrough success and became a widely studied example (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012). Share Our Strength already had established relationships with restaurants through Taste of the Nation and other programs. The Charge Against Hunger campaign leveraged those relationships to provide another source of revenue for SOS and a marketing benefit for its corporate partner. Consumers were encouraged to dine out at participating restaurants to help fight hunger. American Express donated three cents from every transaction during October, November, and December from 1993 to 1996 (Nelson, Kanso, & Levitt, 2007). Over the four-year period, Charge Against Hunger raised $21 million for Share Our Strength, as well as increasing awareness of hunger issues and raising the profile of American Express, which was working to improve its image within the restaurant industry (Nelson et al., 2007). The campaign was lauded as a model for future cause-marketing endeavors. Other corporation-sponsored events were developed, including the Great American Bake Sale, Restaurants for Relief, and A Tasteful Pursuit. Although not all events succeeded, SOS became a “cause-marketing machine” (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012). Community Wealth Venture By 1998, SOS had attracted wide attention for its fundraising success and other nonprofits were calling for advice on how they could create successful commercial partnerships with businesses and start their own revenue-generating enterprises. SOS decided to leverage that visibility by establishing its own for-profit subsidiary, to provide consulting services to other nonprofits desiring to establish cause-marketing partnerships and earned-income ventures. The new consulting firm, Community Wealth Ventures (CWV), would generate profits to help support SOS. Community Wealth Ventures refined and expanded Shore’s concept of community wealth and developed materials for nonprofits to use in planning commercial partnerships and earned-income ventures (including some content that was included in Chapter 14 of this text). Community Wealth Ventures returned $1 million in profits to SOS in its first eight years and successfully partnered with hundreds of organizations, including high-profile clients such as City Year, KaBOOM!, and the Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids. In 2013, Community Wealth Ventures changed its name to Community Wealth Partners, reflecting a shift in emphasis from commercial partnerships and earned-income ventures to a broader relationship with nonprofit clients, related to achieving social change. This refocus was consistent with new directions adopted by its parent, SOS, which are discussed in the next section of this case (Celep, 2013.)
By most measures, Share Our Strength’s first 20 years in operation were a success. By 2004, it had raised more than $200 million for thousands of hunger and poverty organizations, received positive media attention, and had created a widely emulated model for successful cause-marketing initiatives with major corporate sponsors. But it had become clear to Shore that SOS’s activity as a grant maker was not achieving the broader impact that was needed. As Shore observed, “we made grants to thousands of organizations around the United States, all of which were doing an impressive job of feeding hungry people, but few of which were focused on ending hunger … much of the focus, internally and externally, was on the entrepreneurial ways it [SOS] generated funds (through innovations in cause-related marketing) rather than on how it [SOS] used the funds to advance its mission” (Shore, Hammond, & Celep, 2013). Indeed, despite the efforts of Share Our Strength and public programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), hunger in America persisted. As Shore explained, “It was … unsatisfying that we could not quantify our impact. Was the funding we provided equal to 1 percent of what was needed, or was it 50 percent? When was our job done? Without a specific measure of success it was impossible to know” (Shore et al., 2013). Additionally, after years of growth, SOS’s fundraising totals were flat (Blum, 2012b). Shore knew that a new approach was essential. The only way to maximize impact was to markedly change how the organization was approaching the hunger problem. SOS needed to develop a vision of what success would look like, develop a scalable model that would permanently change the system, and define what its impact would be. Perhaps most important, SOS would need to leverage its strong existing assets to challenge the root of the hunger problem in new, significant ways (Shore, 2013). Shore recognized that SOS would need to “go big or go home” (Blum, 2012b). He concluded that the answer would lie in shifting activities from broad anti-hunger issues to a specific problem and with a specific achievable goal: end childhood hunger in America (Shore et al., 2013). The problem of childhood hunger is widespread. Nearly half of the 47 million people receiving support through the SNAP program (sometimes referred to as “food stamps”) are children. One in five American children do not consistently receive the nutritious food they need. All American children are eligible for school breakfasts, but only 11 million were receiving them in 2015 (“Q&A,” 2015). The effects of childhood hunger are profound. A study conducted by the consulting firm Deloitte (Augustine-Thottungal, Kern, Key, & Sherman, 2013) found hungry children under age three suffer from cognitive impairment hat limits their future educational and economic success. In addition, hungry children are 31 percent more likely to be hospitalized and are 3.4 times more likely to be overweight or obese (Augustine-Thottungal et al., 2013). A lack of nutritious food leads kids to higher levels of anxiety and aggressive behavior, and hungry teens are more likely to be suspended from school and suffer from difficulty in interpersonal relationships (Share Our Strength, 2011). To achieve its new goal, SOS would launch a new nationwide campaign: No Kid Hungry (NKH). Its strategy would shift from funding programs that provided food to connecting kids in need with existing programs that provide food but remained underutilized, such as the School Breakfast Program (SBP) and the Summer Meals programs. It also would launch the Cooking Matters program to provide low-income families with food skills to stretch their food budgets, use nutrition information to make healthier food choices, and cook affordable meals (Augustine-Thottungal et al., 2013). But No Kid Hungry would become more than just a slogan, a campaign, or a collection of programs—it would become the rebranded face of Share Our Strength
No Kid Hungry would focus on initiatives state-by-state and on building cross-sector collaborations in order to achieve scale, consistent with the concept of collective impact (Shore et al., 2013). The campaign operated under the premise that American children are not hungry because of a lack of available food in society or a lack of nutrition programs intended to provide this food to children. Rather, kids lack access to these programs (“Q&A,” 2015). So, instead of focusing on providing food, Share Our Strength would become an organization that served as a connector—connecting children to federal nutrition programs; connecting state agencies, nonprofits, and donors in order to achieve state-level solutions; and connecting federal food dollars with states. SOS’s role would be to provide the coordination and resources each community needed to remove the roadblocks that were keeping children from participating in food and nutrition programs (Shore et al., 2013). Share Our Strength developed a network of state-and city-based No Kid Hungry campaigns to achieve these purposes (“Q&A,” 2015). The campaign was addressed to both children and parents through a number of new and existing programs, in order to increase the number of kids who were eating three nutritious meals a day
The new strategy would require additional investments and entail some risks. As Shore explains, “The challenge is: Are you willing to do less program and less service in the short term if that frees up money to allow you to make the investments you need to do even more program and service in the long term” (Blum, 2012b)? SOS spent $300,000 to develop the new brand identity (Blum, 2012a), introducing a new name, tagline, and logo. As illustrated in Figure 1, No Kid Hungry became SOS’s primary consumer-facing brand, with the original name of the organization reduced to the equivalent of a tagline (Shore et al., 2013). With its new strategy, Share Our Strength needed to build its internal capacity, and it grew quickly, hiring nearly 100 additional employees and increasing its operating budget from $6 million in 2009 to $14 million in 2013. The new staff members included individuals with strengths in advocacy, marketing, accounting, public policy, and program management (Blum, 2012a). This change was not easy for existing staff, some of whom had to train for new roles, change their working style, or even transition out of the organization (Shore et al., 2013). The growth included the hiring of a chief strategy officer, who was responsible for removing established silos among Share Our Strength’s fundraising, administration, and program initiatives in order to leverage all of the organization’s assets together. The staff was reorganized to create cross-departmental teams, leading to a more integrated way of thinking about the deployment of assets to support the NKH campaign. An organization-wide dashboard was introduced to track performance metrics and all staff were provided with access so that they could celebrate successes and learn from failures (Case Foundation, n.d.). The focus on capacity was also reflected in changes to SOS’s board of directors, which began to include more individuals with diverse business and political experience (Blum, 2012a). The strategic shift posed several challenges for internal communications. Share Our Strength’s leaders knew it was vital that each employee could explain the organization’s new goal and inspire others to join the cause, so staff spent several weeks on efforts to ensure message cohesion (Shore et al., 2013). In some cases, new employees hired to implement the new direction brought work styles and experiences that were different from those of the existing SOS team, which led to some initial tensions. For example, new political campaign operatives were accustomed to operating in fast-paced, urgent environments, while some existing staff had been accustomed to working at a more deliberate pace (Shore et al., 2013). These styles needed to be reconciled before moving forward. Share Our Strength’s leadership understood that it was important to build national awareness around childhood hunger, both to inspire the public and increase political support for food programs. Though its new branding helped, SOS would need to reframe the discussion around hunger, both to show that it was a solvable problem and to build a bigger network of support. Instead of talking about hunger on its own, SOS sought to connect it with other problems that resonated in communities across the nation, presenting childhood hunger as an education issue, a health issue, and an economic issue. In some cases, SOS’s new strategy caused discomfort and misalignment with existing nonprofit partners. As Shore explains, “Some of our nonprofit partners were nervous about being held accountable for ending childhood hunger” (Shore et al., 2013). Some corporate partners also failed to make the transition to the new approach and discontinued their support (Shore et al., 2013).
Working with the consulting firm Deloitte, SOS began to identify the barriers to receiving school breakfasts. One problem they discovered was that this meal was typically served in the school cafeteria before the first morning bell rang (Augustine-Thottungal et al., 2013). With variable bus schedules and busy parents, students often missed the school’s breakfast. Additionally, research found that the notion of school breakfast holds a stigma—the idea that “poor kids” must go to the cafeteria to get an extra meal; therefore, some hungry children would avoid going. SOS’s solution was to take breakfast out of the cafeteria and make it part of the school day so that more children would have the chance to participate. The organization created a model for students to eat together in the classroom after the bell rang (Augustine-Thottungal et al., 2013). In order to make this delivery model effective, SOS needed to capitalize on one of its own strengths—the ability to build partnerships. Instead of just relying on corporate partners as it had in the past, the No Kid Hungry campaign would require SOS to reach into its networks to achieve a multisector approach—using private money to collaborate with governments and local nonprofits to unlock the government funds that were available but untapped (Blum, 2012a). In the school breakfast program’s pilot state of Maryland, Share Our Strength reached out to then-governor Martin O’Malley, who, in 2008, declared that his state would be the first to end childhood hunger (Share Our Strength Center for Best Practices, n.d.). O’Malley brought together school superintendents from throughout the state to urge them to adopt breakfasts in the classroom, as well as increasing funding for Maryland Meals for Achievement, a state-run program that connects high-need schools with resources to provide free and reduced-price meals for students. Additionally, Share Our Strength recruited a core advisory group, made up of state offices and corporate and nonprofit partners, such as Kellogg, Kaiser Permanente, the Walmart Foundation, Maryland Hunger Solutions, and faith-based and food-focused organizations (Share Our Strength Center for Best Practices, n.d.). These collaborations helped provide funding, food resources for meals, school access, and awareness. Following the Maryland pilot, the No Kid Hungry School Breakfast Program was expanded to a number of states, where the campaign often works with small community nonprofits and state legislatures to advance its efforts (Shore et al., 2013).
Although Bill Shore had a background in politics, lobbying and advocacy were not a major emphasis for SOS during its first 20 years. With the introduction of No Kid Hungry, advocacy efforts became a central part of SOS’s strategy. Share Our Strength has sought to influence food-based legislation, including reauthorization of the Child Nutrition Act, which provides funding for School Breakfast, National School Lunch, Child and Adult Care Food, Summer Food Service, and the Fresh Fruit and Vegetable programs. It also has lobbied for funding of SNAP and the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC). Advocacy activities have included visits to Capitol Hill by SOS leaders, prominent celebrities, and children affected by hunger. SOS also has arranged multiple advocacy days and flooded congressional offices with meetings, calls, and e-mails (Share Our Strength, n.d.). As it had in Maryland, Share Our Strength met with governors to unlock state and local funding on anti-hunger initiatives (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012). With the support of elected officials, other states increased aid for school breakfasts in thousands of schools. After-school snacks and summer meals also became a target area for SOS’s state advocacy (Shore et al., 2013). SOS also used its new strategy to create a nationwide grassroots advocacy campaign to mobilize individuals to take action in their own states. Its Team No Kid Hungry initiative enlists volunteers to speak out for childhood hunger issues by attending town hall meetings, e-mailing and calling legislators, and recruiting additional members through social media efforts. Team No Kid Hungry has sent hundreds of thousands of letters and e-mails, and made calls to advocate in support of the goal to end childhood hunger in America, including more than 40,000 pieces of correspondence in 2013 alone (Share Our Strength, 2014). No Kid Hungry’s social media presence was expanded and by 2017 the organization had over 184,000 Facebook followers (
Though it had already been a leader in fundraising efforts, No Kid Hungry provided SOS with a new platform for support from diverse audiences, including additional corporate sponsors, government, and individual donors. Following the launch of the No Kid Hungry campaign, revenues increasing from $13 million in 2008 to nearly $55 million in 2016 (Share Our Strength, n.d.). In 2016, 43 percent of revenues came from corporations, 20 percent from foundations, 20 percent from individual giving and events, 10 percent from investments, and 7 percent from government grants. The organization reported that 69 percent of revenue was spent on programs, 24 percent on fundraising, and 7 percent on management and general expenses (Share Our Strength, n.d.). Some fundraising programs that previously had floundered achieved new success after the introduction of the No Kid Hungry campaign. For example, in 1996, Share Our Strength had partnered with chain restaurants to launch a program called Dine Across America, in which the restaurants would donate a portion of their proceeds. Dine Across America’s goal was to raise $1 million in 1996, but instead it produced only $250,000. In view of this disappointment, SOS had abandoned the program. But the idea was resurrected as Dine Out for No Kid Hungry (Crutchfield & Grant, 2012). The new weeklong, annual event is sponsored by well-known industry names, such as Arby’s, Denny’s, and Grimaldi’s Pizzeria (Share Our Strength, 2017). By 2016, SOS reported that No Kid Hungry had “helped to achieve” a total of 500 million meals served and a 20 percent reduction in the “number of kids at risk of hunger in the United States. In addition to other achievements, the organization reported 40,000 new summer meal sites to serve children when school is out, 464,000 families taught about healthy meals through the Cooking Matters program, and three million more kids eating school breakfast since the beginning of the No Kids Hungry campaign (Share Our Strength, n.d.).
What lessons can be drawn from Share Our Strength’s evolution and growth following introduction of the No Kid Hungry campaign? Cofounder and CEO Bill Shore attributes its success to the clear goal the campaign has set. “Holding ourselves accountable to a specific outcome that was bold but believable inspired our stakeholders and gave them co nfidence that we merited their investment” (Shore et al., 2013). A study by the Case Foundation also identifies the importance of “making a big bet,” which for Share Our Strength involved “[setting] a goal to end childhood hunger in the United States, not just reduce it” (Case Foundation, n.d.). But it also was essential to maintain a “delicate balance of boldness and believability.” In other words, it was necessary to demonstrate that the goal could be within reach and provide evidence that strategies put in place could be effective in achieving it. Establishing that credibility required “[proving] the concept first and then [going to] scale” (Case Foundation, n.d.). That was accomplished by testing methods and models in two pilot states, Maryland and Arkansas, before expanding to a national effort. That required concentrating resources in target programs, despite the sensitive fact that funds were raised in other states and communities as well (Case Foundation, n.d.). As the Case Foundation observes, addressing major problems like childhood hunger “takes more than a village” (Case Foundation, n.d.). It requires building diverse networks, which was central to the No Kid Hungry campaign. That included bringing together public officials, school leaders, corporations, parents, and other stakeholders and connecting childhood hunger to other national social problems, such as education and health care
The No Kid Hungry campaign has shifted the way SOS looks, how it conducts business, and the strategies it employs to end childhood hunger. It has been a success by many measures. However, key questions and challenges remain. Some critics charge that SOS is feeding hungry children on a daily basis but still not getting to the underlying problem of hunger in America (Shore et al., 2013). Shore acknowledges that getting to the root causes of hunger and poverty is essential, but argues that school breakfasts and lunches are a bridge toward the goal, since these nutrition programs enable children to become self-sufficient and remove barriers to learning (Shore et al., 2013). Other questions apply to the future of SOS itself. For example, No Kid Hungry was always intended to be a campaign, not the new name of the organization. But has the No Kid Hungry brand effectively replaced the brand of Share Our Strength? If Share Our Strength succeeds in achieving its goal, that is, if childhood hunger is eventually eliminated, then the rationale for No Kid Hungry will cease to exist and the organization will need to redefine its mission. SOS could become a victim of its own success. If it decides to change its focus in future years, will it ever be able to reestablish its original brand? SOS receives a significant portion of revenue from corporate marketing partnerships (Blum, 2012a). The No Kid Hungry rebrand became a more recognizable, and therefore attractive, prospect to corporate sponsors, which has caused SOS’s revenues to surge. But, with 43 percent of revenue coming from corporations in 2016 (Share Our Strength, n.d.), could resource dependence prove to be a vulnerability should corporate priorities shift or a new recession affect companies’ ability to provide sponsorship support? What if government priorities were to shift and funding for food programs was substantially increased—or reduced? How would that impact the No Kid Hungry campaign? Or, again, what if childhood hunger someday ceases to be a national problem? The latter would appear to be a possibility, but not an imminent likelihood. By 2015, the rate of U.S. food hardship had declined to 16 percent, from 19 percent in 2013, as the economy continued to recover from the Great Recession (Food Research and Action Center, 2016). But the percentage was barely below what it had been prior to that economic catastrophe and millions of American families, including children, still faced insecurity about their access to food (Food Research and Action Center, 2016). As the Food Research and Action Center observed, hunger often is an invisible problem: In America’s communities, hunger often is hidden by individuals or families that do not want to share with their neighbors the fact that they are struggling economically. Sometimes hunger hides behind doors of nice houses with mortgages in default, or the heat turned off, or all of the income going to housing costs, leaving little or none for food. Sometimes it hides behind the stoic faces of parents or grandparents who skip meals to protect their children or grandchildren from hunger. It goes unseen by those not looking for it. (Food Research and Action Center, 2016) NOTE: This case was written by Gretchen Wieland, a graduate student in the Trachtenberg School of Public Policy and Public Administration at the George Washington University in spring, 2015. It has been substantially adapted and updated by the textbook author, including new material, recent data, and events since 2015.
. Leslie Crutchfield and Heather McLeod Grant (2012) write: If the 1980s and 1990s were all about replicating programs and the [decade of the 2000s] was all about building effective organizations, we believe the next leap is to see nonprofits as catalytic agents of change. We must begin to study and understand nonprofits not merely as organizations housed within four walls, but as catalysts that work within, and change, entire systems. (p. 16) Does Share Our Strength illustrate this point? If so, explain how.

  1. What principles of marketing discussed in Chapter 10 are illustrated in the case of Share Our Strength?
  2. The No Kid Hungry campaign has achieved wide brand awareness. If that campaign were to come to a conclusion, what steps would Share Our Strength need to take to reassert its organizational brand?
  3. Is Bill Shore a social entrepreneur? If so, which definitions of that term seem to apply most closely?
  4. Many factors affect the prevalence of hunger, including general economic conditions, the commitment of state officials, and political support for government food programs. In light of these various factors, how should Share Our Strength try to evaluate its own impact on the problem?
  5. What changes in internal culture may have been required when Share Our Strength shifted its strategy from funding other nonprofits that provided food toward advocacy to increase funding for government food programs?
  6. Go back to Chapter 14 and review the discussion regarding nonprofit earned-income strategies. What assets did Share Our Strength leverage in creating partnerships with corporations and other businesses?
  7. Go back to Chapter 6 of this text. How do the various terms related to the outcomes model related to SOS and how it reports the impact of No Kid Hungry?
  8. If Share Our Strength desired to diversify its revenues in order to reduce its dependence on events and corporate sponsors, which fundraising strategies and methods discussed in Chapter 13 do you think might hold promise? Explain

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